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ABSTRACT 
For societies emerging from repressive regimes or violent conflict, finding an 
appropriate response to deal with past gross and flagrant abuses of human 
rights have been dauntingly challenging. Undoubtedly, the situation is much 
more precarious and complex in totally collapsed states where there is no 
functioning central authority. By and large, most studies on accountability 
mechanisms for past human rights violations focus on the situations of 
transition from repressive regimes to democracy. In consequence, the 
questions and different challenges emanating from on-going violent conflicts 
in collapsed states, and the role of criminal accountability in those situations 
are not sufficiently examined. In view of that, the focus of this article is to 
investigate the role that transitional justice can play in the protection and 
promotion of human rights in the collapsed state of Somalia. Furthermore, 
this article also examines the intrinsic interplay between politics, human 
rights, peace, justice and reconciliation in such situations. Finally, the article 
suggests that instead of a haphazard application of accountability 
mechanisms that often exacerbate the situation, what is imperative is a 
policy that takes past atrocities into account and devises mechanisms geared 
towards both dealing with the past and preparing for future stability. 
 
Introduction 
 
In the preamble of the United Nations Charter, the member states pledge “to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime have brought untold sorrow to 
mankind”.1 Since the establishment of the United Nations, the number of inter-state wars and 
other related violent conflicts has declined. At the same time, there has been a considerable 
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1 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945,	1 UNTS 
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proliferation of internal conflicts with devastating effects on the world population.2 Admittedly, 
this high profile pledge has not sufficiently succeeded in preventing an estimated 250 internal 
conflicts that have occurred since the Charter was adopted. These devastating conflict situations 
have claimed more than 86 million victims.3 
During the period between the criminal trials in the aftermath of World War Two in Nuremberg 
and Tokyo, and the end of Cold War, there were no major prosecutions for widespread human 
rights violations. In fact, many egregious atrocities were purposefully perpetrated with impunity.4 
The existence of states’ treaty-based positive obligation to investigate, prosecute or punish the 
violators of some egregious crimes notwithstanding, the issue had not, surprisingly, been a main 
concern to either human rights advocates or states until the end of the Cold War.5 On the one 
hand, the appalling crimes committed within states were not the concern of other nations due to 
the paramount importance attached to the notion of national sovereignty and other expedient 
political considerations.6 Consequently, the exceedingly polarising political rivalry between the 
superpowers had not been conducive to the creation of a general consensus on how to deal with 
the massive human rights violations internationally.7 
Meanwhile, the end of military rule in South America and the end of the Cold War created an 
opportunity for individual states, and the international community as a whole, to devise suitable 
ways to deal with heinous crimes of previous regimes.8 Although the establishment of two ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals and several hybrid courts signalled the seeming willingness on the 
part of the United Nations to take the issue of justice seriously, numerous atrocious human rights 
abuses are still being carried out with impunity in different parts of the world.9 
The notion of transitional justice is defined by Ruti Teitel as “the conception of justice associated 
with periods of political change, characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of 
repressive predecessor regimes.”10 Noticeably, this definition is narrow on two accounts. First, it 
covers only the situations where human rights violations are noticeably perpetrated by state 
agents and the old regime is succeeded by a more democratic one. Second and more importantly, 
non-judicial mechanisms seem to be excluded. In a more optimistic vein, the United Nations 
adopted a more expansive definition of the concept of transitional justice explicitly encompassing: 
                                                
2 J. Balint, ‘An Empirical Study of Conflict, Conflict Victimization and Legal Redress’ in C.C. Joyner and C.M. 
Bassiouni (eds.), Reining in Impunity for International Crimes and Serious Violations of Fundamental Human Rights, Pau: 
L’Association Internationale de Droit Penal 1998, 101-124, p. 107. 
3 M.C. Bassiouni, ‘‘Searching for Peace’ and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability’, Law and 
Contemporary Problems 1996, p. 10. 
4 T. Meron, ‘International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities’, The American Journal of International Law 1995-3, 
p. 554; J.L. Balint, ‘The Place of Law in Addressing International Regime Conflicts, Law and Contemporary 
Problems’, Law and Contemporary Problems 1997-4, pp. 103-104; C.C. Joyner, ‘Redressing Impunity for Human 
Rights Violations: The Universal Declaration and the Search for Accountability’, Denver Journal of International 
Law and Policy 1997-1998-4, p. 593. 
5 N. Roht-Arriaza, ‘Combating Impunity: Some Thoughts on the Way Forward’, Law and Contemporary Problems 
1996-4, p. 93. 
6 T. Forsberg, ‘The Philosophy and Practice of Dealing with the Past: Some Conceptual and Normative Issues’, 
in N. Biggar (ed.), Burying the Past: Making Peace and Doing Justice after Civil Conflict, Washington, D.C: Georgetown 
University Press 2007, 57-72, p. 58. 
7 A. Cassese, ‘On the Current Trends Towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of 
International Humanitarian Law’, European Journal of International Law Journal 1998, p. 8. 
8 ‘Questions of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations (Civil and Political)’, Revised Final 
Report prepared by Mr. Joinet pursuant to Sub-Commission Decision 1996/119, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1, 2 October 1997. 
9 Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2014/2015: The State of the World’s Human Rights, 
Index: POL 10/0001/2015, 25 February 2015. 
10 R. G. Teitel, ‘Transitional Genealogy’, Harvard Human Rights Journal 2003, p. 69. 
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The full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to 
terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve 
justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include both judicial and non-judicial 
mechanisms, with differing levels of international involvement (and none at all) and 
individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and 
dismissals, or a combination thereof.11 
For the purposes of this article, the latter definition will be the basis for our inquiry. In the 
meantime, many post-conflict societies still tenaciously struggle to deal with past atrocities and in 
that respect the debate about the transitional justice and how best to implement it remains 
unabated.12 In the case of Somalia, even though the UN Security Council has been disturbed “by 
the magnitude of the human suffering caused by the conflict” and recognised that “the 
continuation of the situation in Somalia constitutes threat to international peace and security”, no 
meaningful attention has been given to dealing with past human rights violations.13 In fact, 
Somalia has been devastated by unremitting human rights abuses for the last thirty years. In the 
last decade of its rule from 1980 to 1990, the military government in Somalia became increasingly 
repressive. For instance, according to the 1989 Human Rights Watch report on Somalia and the 
reports of a number of other human rights organisations, over several hundred thousand civilians 
were unlawfully killed by the military government. These reports also reveal that rebel groups 
perpetrated massive human rights violations.14 After the ouster of the military regime in 1991, the 
rebel leaders were unable to agree on power sharing and the country was divided into fiefdoms 
controlled by warlords, clan elders, and regional administrations. As a result, human rights and 
humanitarian law violations continued and further intensified.15  
Not only Somali perpetrators have been involved in human rights violations, but foreign troops 
under UN command have also been implicated. For example, in 1993 the Commission on 
Human Rights received reports alleging that United Nations troops in Somalia perpetrated gross 
violations of human rights and humanitarian law.16 Subsequently, the United Nations were 
urgently asked to initiate an independent and impartial investigation into the abuses and loss of 
life caused by the UN forces.17 Unfortunately, no meaningful investigations were carried out as a 
result either by the United Nations or by individual troop contributing countries.18 Furthermore, 
                                                
11 United Nations, ‘The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post Conflict Societies’, Report of 
the Secretary-General, S(2004), 616, para. 8.  
12 N.J. Kritz (ed.), Transitional Justice: How emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, Vol. 3, Washington, D.C: 
United States Institute of Peace Press 1995; N. Biggar (ed.), Burying the Past: Justice, Forgiveness, and Reconciliation in 
the Politics of South Africa, Guatemala, East Germany, and Northern Ireland, Washington, D.C: Georgetown University 
Press 2003; B.A. Leebaw, ‘The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice’, Human Rights Quarterly 2008, pp. 95-
118; M.J. Aukerman, ‘Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for Understanding Transitional 
Justice’, Harvard Human Rights Journal 2002-39; Teitel, ‘Transitional Justice Genealogy’.  
13 UN Security Council Resolution 746, S/RES/746 (1992) of 17 March 1992; UN Security Council Resolution 
767, S/RES/767 (1992) of 24 July 1992; UN Security Council Resolution 775, S/RES/775 (1992) of 28 August 
1992; UN Security Council Resolution 1838, S/RES/1838 (2005) of 7 October 2005. 
14 Africa Watch, Somalia: Government at War With its Own People, New York: Africa Watch 1990; Amnesty 
International, ‘Somalia: A Long-term Human Rights Crisis’, AL Index: AFR/52/26/88. 
15 Human Rights Watch Africa, Somalia Beyond Warlords: The Need for a Verdict on Human Rights Abuses, Vol. 3, New 
York: Africa Watch 1993; Physicians for Human Rights, ‘No Mercy in Mogadishu: The Human Cost of the 
Conflict and the Struggle for Relief’, 26 March 1997; Amnesty International, ‘Somalia: A Human Rights 
Disaster’, AL Index: AFR 52/01/92. 
16 Commission on Human Rights, ‘Report by the Independent Expert, Mr. F.F. Kozoguizi, on the Condition in 
Somalia’, Prepared in Accordance with Paragraph 6 of Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1993/86, 
E/CN.4/1994/77, para. 14; UN Security Resolution 794, S/RES/794 (1992) of 3 December 1992 mandated 
US led Unified Task Force(UNITAF), later UNOSOM II took over from UNITAF. 
17 Commission on Human Rights, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur, Ms. M. Rishmawi’, E/CN.4/1998/86, 16 
January 1996, para. 97; Amnesty International, Human Rights and Peacekeepers, AL INDEX: 1OR 40/01/94, 
para. 21; African Rights, ‘Somalia: Human Rights Abuses by United Nations Forces’, London, July 1993. 
18 Amnesty International, ‘Human Rights and Peacekeepers’,(1994) para. 21. 
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in late 2006, Ethiopian troops invaded Somalia with United States’ financial and political 
support.19 Subsequently, Ethiopian troops, Somali Transitional Government troops and to a 
lesser extent insurgent militias perpetrated massive violations of human rights and humanitarian 
law including war crimes and crimes against humanity. The most frequent violations of 
humanitarian law included, among others, indiscriminate bombardment of densely populated 
areas, unlawful killing of thousands of unarmed civilians, rape, and the use of civilians as human 
shields.20 However, as Georgette Gagnon, Africa Director of Human Rights Watch rightly observed: 
“[t]he world has largely ignored the horrors unfolding in Somalia, but Somali families are still left 
to confront violence that grows with every passing day.”21 Additionally, the current African 
Union troops deployed in Somalia are also accused of perpetrating human rights violations 
including sexual violence and exploitation with impunity.22 By and large, most studies on 
accountability mechanisms for past human rights violations focus on the situations of transition 
from repressive regimes to democracy. In consequence, the questions and different challenges 
emanating from on-going violent conflicts in collapsed states, and the role of criminal 
accountability in those situations are not sufficiently examined.  
The focus of this article is to investigate the role that transitional justice can play in the protection 
of human rights in totally collapsed states. The argument in this article proceeds in three parts. 
Part I considers the failure of Somali ‘stakeholders’ and the international community to include 
human rights violations in negotiations aimed at ending the protracted conflict in Somalia. It 
seems that impunity is seen as a reasonable political price worth paying for peaceful settlement. 
Part II compares different transitional justice mechanisms including judicial prosecutions, truth 
commission, lustration and amnesty, and their applicability to totally collapsed states. Part III 
explores the role that universal jurisdiction can play in compensating the lack of capacity in 
dealing with massive human rights abuses in collapsed states. The article argues that instead of a 
haphazard application of accountability mechanisms that often exacerbate the situation, what is 
imperative is a policy that takes past atrocities into account and devises mechanisms geared 
towards both dealing with the past and preparing for future stability. 
 
I. Failure to Discuss Past Atrocities during Somali Peace Negotiations 
 
In more than the fifteen reconciliation conferences that have been organised to date for Somali 
groups since 1991, the issue of justice has not been addressed. This, in spite of the fact that the 
Security Council noted with profound regret and concern “the continuing reports of widespread 
violations of international humanitarian law and the general absence of the rule of law in 
Somalia.”23 Furthermore, the Secretary-General of the United Nations lamented “the 
indiscriminate use of force and the killing of civilians, mostly non-combatants.”24 In his book 
Crimes against Humanity, Geoffrey Robertson quotes the following joke: “[w]hen someone kills a 
                                                
19 B. Slavin, ‘US Support Key to Ethiopia’s Invasion’, USA Today, 8 January 2007; for a discussion on the 
legality of the Ethiopian intervention, see A.A.M. Khayre, ‘Self-Defence, Intervention by Invitation, or Proxy 
War? The Legality of the 2006 Ethiopian Invasion of Somalia’, African Journal of International and Comparative Law 
2014-22. 
20 Human Rights Watch, ‘“So Much to Fear”: War Crimes and the Devastation of Somalia’, 8 December 2008; 
Human Rights Watch, ‘Shell-Shocked: Civilians under Siege’, 13 August 2007.  
21 Human Rights Press Release, ‘Somalia: War Crimes Devastate Population’, 8 December 2008. 
22 S. Raghavan, ‘Rising Civilian Toll Ignites Anger at African Force as it Battles Somali Militants’, Washington 
Post, 18 July 2010; Amnesty International, ‘Civilians in Somalia Face Ongoing Human Rights Violations’, AFR 
52/003/2010, 25 March 2010; Human Rights Watch, ‘The Power These Men Have Over Us: Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse by African Union Forces in Somalia’, 8 September 2014. 
23 United Nations Security Council Resolution 814, S/RES/814 (1993) of 26 March, 1993. 
24 United Nations, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia’, S/1997/135, 16 September 
1997, p. 32; see also UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary General on Somalia’, S/2016/27, 8 January 
2016, paras. 50, 52. 
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man, he is put in prison. When someone kills 20 people, he is declared mentally insane. But when 
someone kills 200,000 people, he is invited to Geneva for peace negotiations.”25 Sadly, it seems 
that in the Somali context this has been a strategy that has been frequently applied with deadly 
consequence. It is noteworthy to state that the United Nations acknowledged “the continued 
outbreaks of hostilities are motivated by individual rivalries of faction leaders and criminal 
activities rather than wider issues.”26 Most strikingly yet, some diplomats involved in the Somali 
peace conference acknowledge in hindsight that “they might have overstated the importance of 
the warlords and their capacity to deliver any sort of stability.”27 Evidently giving warlords a 
legitimacy to dominate peace conferences and be seen as the sole representatives of the Somali 
population was not a correct approach. Consequently, it can be argued that the United Nations 
and other organisers of past peace conferences for Somalia inadvertently encouraged and 
promoted violence by legitimizing anyone who utilised it and made a prerequisite to be accepted 
as a representative leader.28 In the first decade after the collapse of the central government of 
Somalia in 1991, anyone who assembled militias or initiated a war to capture a territory 
automatically got an invitation to attend the next peace and reconciliation conference organised 
for Somalia. As a result, there had been a proliferation of warring factions in Somalia. For 
example, “the Addis Ababa agreement of 27 of March 1993 was signed by 15 factions.”29 In 
October 1996, the Ethiopian government brought together 27 faction leaders in Sodere to attend 
another reconciliation conference.30 The United Nations recognised that “this multiplication of 
factions will complicate further the prospects for the preparatory meeting and the subsequent 
national reconciliation conference and must be overcome without further delay.”31 In that 
respect, as Akhavan argues, stigmatising criminal conduct and setting other criteria for 
representation than participation of the violence may massively contribute to reconciliation.32 
It is not peculiar to Somalia that perpetrators of heinous crimes enjoy impunity. In general, even 
though the violent conflicts, whether internal or international, have sadly victimised millions of 
innocent people, unfortunately negligible attention has been paid to the investigation and 
prosecution of these crimes.33 Only a very limited number of individuals were held accountable 
for the crimes they allegedly perpetrated irrespective of the severity and magnitude of the 
violations involved. The primary reason that these perpetrators have been escaping accountability 
for their human rights violations is that more importance is attached to political settlements. In 
most (post)conflict situations, impunity is seen as a reasonable political price to be paid to reach a 
political settlement intended to ensure an end to ongoing costly violent confrontation or repressive 
regimes.34 In fact, the rights of victims and their legitimate longing for justice are subordinated to 
                                                
25 G. Robertson, Crimes against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice, London: Penguin Press 1999, p. 190. 
26 United Nations, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia’, S/2003/231, 26 February 
2003, para. 54. 
27 S.Healy, Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa: How Conflicts Connect and Peace Agreements Unravel,London: Chatham 
House 2008  p. 27. 
28 A.I. Samatar & A.I. Samatar, ‘Somali Reconciliation: Editorial Note’, Bildhaan, 2003; See also UN Security 
Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia’, S/2000/1211, 19 December 2000. 
29 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Somalia’, S/2000/1211, 19 
December 2000, paras. 8, 9. 
30 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General concerning the situation in Somalia Part II’, 
S/1997/135, 17 February 1997, para. 25. 
31 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on Somalia’, S/1994/977, 17 
August 1994, para. 23. 
32 P. Akhavan, ‘Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?’, American 
Journal of International Law 2001, p. 7. 
33 Bassiouni, ‘Searching for Peace’, p. 11. 
34 M.S. Ellis, ‘Combating Impunity and Enforcing Accountability as a Way to Promote Peace and Stability: The 
Role of International War Crimes Tribunals’, Journal of National Security Law & Policy 2006-2008-2, pp. 111-12.  
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political trade-offs.35 Mostly negotiating with the individuals who are accused of gross violations of 
human rights is necessary for the sake of achieving peace.36 
The quandary faced by mediators and others who are involved in negotiations is whether to 
prioritise peace or justice. Reconciliation after war and a grotesque pattern of gross violations of 
human rights is a matter of creating peace in the present, and of sustaining peace in the future.37 
For a start, peace is not simply a matter of stopping physical violence. It is also a matter of helping 
people overcome what has been done to them and of overcoming what they have done, so that a 
future might be built. In that respect, the UN Report on Peace Operations recognised that peace 
building is “more than just the absence of war” and that it encompasses, among others 
“promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques”.38 
Some scholars observe that “without justice there can be no lasting peace”, arguing that peace 
entails more than a cessation of hostilities.39 In light of that, Bassiouni contends that if justice is 
neglected any peace achieved will undoubtedly be temporary.40 Similarly, Casesse suggests that 
“[u]ntil the persons responsible for horrific crimes that shock the conscience of mankind are 
brought to book, ethnic and nationalistic hatred, the desire for revenge and the seeds of armed 
violence will survive and threaten internal and international peace.”41 Equally, other scholars 
have emphasised the positive effects of prosecution and relentless pursuit of justice. In view of 
that, Goldstone, while recognising the possibility of detrimental effect that insistent pursuit of 
justice may have on peace negotiations, is yet convinced that the benefits of justice outweigh the 
eventual costs. He asserts that the threat of prosecution and actual indictment of senior political 
figures have helped rather than hindered peace negotiations with respect to Bosnia 
Herzegovina.42 In contrast, other scholars do not recognise a dilemma and are convinced that 
peace takes priority. For instance, Andrew Rigby argues that, in actuality, peace and justice are 
incompatible and it is impossible to pursue both goals simultaneously. In his opinion, pursuit of 
justice is only possible in peaceful societies.43 Equally, others suggest that the pursuit of criminal 
prosecution will hamper efforts at reconciliation.44 In that connection, some commentators 
postulate that this dichotomy between peace and justice is untenable, misconceived and often 
repugnantly misleading.45 In actuality, there is an intrinsic interplay between peace and justice. 
By the same token, if there is no peace and security it will be difficult to carry out any 
                                                
35 P.R. Williams & K.M. Waller, ‘Coercive Appeasement: The Flawed International Response to the Serbian 
Rogue Regime’, New England Law Review 2002, pp. 825-7; M. Scharf & P. Williams, ‘The Functions of Justice 
and Anti-Justice in the Peace-Building Process’, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 2003, p. 164; 
Bassiouni, ‘Searching for Peace’, p. 12. 
36 M.S. Ellis, ‘Combating Impunity’, p. 112. 
37 Scharf & Williams, ‘The Functions of Justice’, p. 165. 
38 United Nations, ‘Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations’, UN Doc./A/55/305-
S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, para. 3; this Report is generally referred to as ‘Brahimi Report’ after its main 
writer, L. Brahimi. 
39 F.E. Allen, ‘Peace through Justice’, University of Cincinnati Law Review 1948, p. 247. 
40 M.C. Bassiouni, ‘Justice and Peace: The Importance of Choosing Accountability over Realpolitiek’, Case 
Western Reserve Journal of International Law 2003; Bassiouni, ‘Searching for Peace’, p. 12. 
41 A. Cassese, ‘Reflections on International Criminal Justice’, Modern Law Review 1998, p. 10. 
42 R. Goldstone, ‘Peace versus Peace’, Nevada Law Journal 2005-2006, p. 421. 
43 A. Rigby, Justice and Reconciliation: After the Violence, Boulder: Lynne Rienner 2001. 
44 K. Henrard, ‘the Viability of National Amnesties in View of the Increasing Recognition of Individual 
Criminal Responsibility at International Law’, Michigan State University DCL-Journal of International Law 1998, p. 
595, 635. 
45 C. Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008, p. 303; A. Seibert-Fohr, 
‘Reconstruction through Accountability’, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 2005, p. 559. 
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accountability measures.46 It seems that this above discussion pertains to countries with 
functioning governments.  
In Somalia’s case, domestic prosecution is not an option because there are no functioning 
institutions to implement such mechanisms. Even if a functioning government is instituted it may 
be unavoidable to delay any plans to deal with past atrocities.47 In addition, if the new authority 
makes an effort to hold everyone who played a part in the heinous atrocity accountable, the newly 
created situation may be “wholly unmanageable and extremely destabilising to the transition.”48  
The only option for Somalia at the moment to deal with past atrocities is an international tribunal 
or a truth commission to be established by the United Nations.49 However, it selection of a certain 
conflict situation to establish a tribunal on is not entirely determined by the severity of the atrocity 
or the magnitude of the conflict. Such important decisions are based upon the possibility of 
obtaining political consensus to pass a resolution under Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter.50 Worse yet, political motivations rather than remedying human rights abuses often 
underlie and motivate the decision to name and choose which conflict to focus on.51 In view of 
that, Mahmood Mamdani pertinently illuminates the reasons why the similar deaths of civilians in 
Iraq and Darfur are named differently; counter-insurgency in Iraq’s case and genocide in the 
Darfur conflict. By the same token, the Congo conflict which claimed the lives of more than four 
million victims is simply identified as civil-war, in comparison with Darfur conflict which is similar 
in nature, although less grave in some ways.52 That point is vividly demonstrated when the UN 
Security Council condemned “the gross and systematic violation of human rights” and recently 
referred the situation of Libya to the International Criminal Court, immediately after the 
hostilities between the government and rebel forces started.53 In stark contrast, the Somali 
situation, which was worse than that of Libya in terms of duration and casualties, was 
conveniently ignored.54 According to the United Nations the situation in Somalia constitutes “the 
worst humanitarian crisis in Africa.”55 In fact, a UN humanitarian officer admitted that “if this 
were happening in Darfur, there would be a big fuss. But Somalia has been a forgotten 
emergency for years.”56 
In 2006, immediately after the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations proclaimed that “the current situation may present the best opportunity that 
Somalia has had in years to find a long term solution to its protracted conflict by putting in place 
a functioning and effective state […]”57 Ironically, it is the period when the defeated warlords 
were returned and allowed to occupy all positions of power in the transitional government.58 
                                                
46 J. Snyder & L. Vinjamuri, ‘Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice’, 
International Security 2003, p. 6. 
47 D. Wippman, ‘Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice’, Fordman International Law Journal 
1999, p. 480.  
48 T.L.H. McCormack, ‘Selective Reaction to Atrocity: War Crimes and the Development of International 
Criminal Law’, Albany Law Review 1996-1997, p. 683.  
49 The possibility of establishing different transitional justice mechanisms in Somalia will be discussed in the next 
section of this article. 
50 Meron, ‘International Criminalisation of Internal Atrocities’, p. 554, 555. 
51 J.E. Alvarez, ‘Crimes of States/ Crimes of Hate: Lessons From Rwanda’, Yale Journal of International Law 1999, 
pp. 452-58.  
52 M. Mamdani, ‘The Politics of Naming: Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency’, London Review of Books 2007, pp. 5-8. 
53 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970, S/RES/1970 (2011), of 26 February 2011. 
54 ‘Libya Revolution Casualties Lower than Expected, Says New Government’, The Guardian, 8 January 2013. 
55 ‘Somalia: A Humanitarian Crisis Disregarded’, Refugee Rights News, 2008-4, at: http://www.refugee-
rights.org/Publications/RRN/2008/June/V4.I4.Somalia.html. 
56 G. Gettleman, ‘Somalia Worst Humanitarian Crisis in Africa, UN Says’, New York Times, 19 November 2007. 
57 United Nations, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia’, S/2007/115, 23 February 
2007, para. 62; see also United Nations, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia’, 
S/2007/659, 7 November 2007, para. 42. 
58 Sally Healy, Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa, p. 26. 
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Perhaps more strikingly still, it was the same period that Human Rights Watch vociferously 
reported that the violent conflict in the country “generated a human rights and humanitarian 
crisis on a scale not seen since 1990s.”59 Nevertheless, the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations seemed to belatedly recognise the importance of gathering of evidence of past atrocities in 
the Somali context. In that respect, he recorded his support for “the proposal to document the 
most serious violations committed as an essential step in the fight against impunity and for the 
creation of justice and reconciliation mechanism.”60 It is important to recall, however, that almost 
eight years earlier, the independent expert, Ghanim Alnajjar urged the Security Council to 
“consider a proposal for the establishment of a committee of experts to investigate allegations of 
past atrocities in Somalia.”61 The request of the independent expert was not heeded. 
Consequently, the past heinous human rights violations in Somalia are not subject to any 
investigation. It is not only criminal prosecutions that can be used to address past atrocities, there 
are other mechanisms that can be employed.  
 
II. Comparing Different Approaches to Justice, Judicial Prosecution, Truth 
Commissions and Amnesty 
 
There is a range of ways of dealing with massive past human rights violations including, among 
others, judicial mechanisms, truth commissions, lustration, compensation, amnesty whether 
blanket or de facto.62 Nonetheless, the manner in which people in a certain country deal with the 
past has a fundamental determinant effect not only on the present but inescapably on whether 
that society will realise durable peace and political stability and governance.63 The type of 
mechanism a certain country chooses is heavily influenced by the contextual situation and the 
type of political transition. In that regard, the United Nations has rightly recognised the need and 
importance “to eschew one-size-fits-all formulas and importation of foreign models [...]” and 
instead ardently encouraged the support of domestic assessments, needs and aspirations.64 
Furthermore, even though the domestic situation is partially significant, the decisions are also 
profoundly informed by particularities associated with specific “periods of political flux.”65 Jeremy 
Sarkin catalogues three broad possible transition scenarios, namely reform, compromise and 
overthrow.66 
The first scenario of reform is contemplated when the old regime still wields considerable power 
and plays a fundamental part in moving from repressive government to a democratic one. In this 
case, if justice is relentlessly pursued it may threaten the fledgling government trying to bring 
about positive change.67 The lopsided power balance is a substantial impediment to the 
implementation of proper transitional justice. In such situations, judicial prosecutions are often 
                                                
59 Human Rights Watch, ‘Shell-Shocked: Civilians Under Siege’, August 13 2007. 
60 United Nations, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia’, S/2010/447, 9 September 2010, para. 83. 
61 Commission on Human Rights, ‘Report of the Independent Expert, Mr. G. Alnajjar’, E/CN.4/2002/119, 14 
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forsaken and amnesties are adopted to placate the demands of the old rulers.68 Similarly, the 
second scenario entails a situation in which the transition is brought about by political 
negotiations and compromise because there is no clear winner and parties are interdependent in 
achieving their common goal. In this context, the old regime normally demands and is awarded 
immunity from future investigation and prosecution of certain past human rights violations.69 The 
third scenario occurs when one faction completely defeats the other parties in the conflict and 
unilaterally forms the new government. The new government can implement systematic reform 
and can vigorously deal with the past without hindrance from any party.70 The trials in 
Nuremberg and Tokyo after the Second World War fall into this category. Sarkin fails to 
acknowledge a fourth political scenario where the old regime is overthrown but there is no 
effective government to replace it. Like the case in Somalia, the war and atrocities have been 
ongoing and perpetrators have been constantly invited to attend reconciliation and peace 
conferences organised in different capital cities. In such circumstances, state institutions are 
destroyed or are in a feeble and precarious situations, judicial institutions need to be reformed 
and sturdily rebuilt before any proceedings can commence; otherwise it will be a case of wanting 
to police the past without literally any police force.71 In that respect, the independent expert on 
the situation of human rights in Somalia appropriately observed that “the absence of an 
accountable government and the lack of infrastructure in the country [...] made the capture and 
bringing to justice of the perpetrators of gross human rights violations an impossible task.”72 
However, the lack of functioning institutions or fear of previous government reorganising to abort 
new initiatives cannot be grounds to forgo or suspend prosecutions. It may be possible to 
postpone the prosecution until institutions and strong enough to carry out proceedings consistent 
with international human rights standards. For example, in El Salvador the International 
Commission of Inquiry acknowledged that the national judiciary was dismally unable to deal with 
massive human rights abuses perpetrated by previous oppressive regime.73 Likewise, in 
Cambodia, decades after the crimes committed by Khmer Rouge, a court was established with 
the help of the United Nations to prosecute the leaders of Khmer Rouge.74 It is also important to 
note that decisions to determine which justice mechanism is suitable for a particular situation 
need to be grounded in legal, moral, political and ethical deliberations. Nonetheless, these 
different measures are supplementary to one another and can be used in any given combination. 
For instance, in Greece, the new government that replaced the military junta prosecuted former 
officials and their associates and purged others from government departments.75 Similarly, in 
Liberia, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, after thorough investigation recommended 
the establishment of a hybrid criminal tribunal to try individuals responsible for the worst 
crimes.76 The following section will examine the individual accountability mechanisms, each on 
its merits. 
II.1 The Applicability of Judicial Prosecution Mechanism in Collapsed States 
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Criminal prosecution has been the dominant conventional reaction to such atrocities in the past. 
The United Nations Security Council has chosen criminal trials when confronted with shocking 
horrors of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and genocide in Rwanda.77The United Nations General 
Assembly urged member states to either extradite or prosecute individuals accused of war crimes 
and crimes against humanity. The resolution goes on to state that refusal to do so is “contrary to 
the United Nations Charter and the generally recognised norms of international law”.78 While 
conceding that there may be situations where judicial prosecutions are unsuitable for practical, 
pragmatic or other policy considerations, Landsman observes that for certain categories of crimes 
prosecution is the only viable option.79 Other commentators argue that holding perpetrators of 
human rights accountable for their crimes can create a culture of human rights observance. 
Additionally, it can send a very strong signal to the society at large that no one is beyond the 
reach of the writs of law. Furthermore, judicial prosecution can contribute to establishing a 
reliable pubic record of what had happened.80 However, it is uncertain whether judicial trials in 
the aftermath of massive human rights violations are capable of establishing undisputed 
comprehensive historical record.81 
It seems that occasionally, the human rights movement is particularly uncompromising and holds 
that only criminal prosecution can deliver justice, inflexibly jettisoning all other options. As 
Barkan warns, holding such rigid positions may establish unrealistic expectations that might in the 
long run prove an insurmountable threshold for post-conflict justice.82 Acknowledging the legal 
ethical and moral dimensions of the accountability measures, it is an immense mistake if the 
human rights movement permits itself to be painted into the corner of either “legalistic” or 
“moralistic” position. Furthermore, human rights organisations are also accused of superficially 
separating international law from international politics.83 As Ramesh Thakur points out, the 
interplay between politics, justice and morality is more complicated than meets the eye.84 
Moreover, it is sometimes inevitable and necessary to take political constraints into account when 
proposing justice mechanisms. For example, if one measure is not available other solutions 
involving accountability should not be rejected outright.85 Occasionally human rights 
organisations seem to hold on to their ‘legalistic’ rhetoric while on the other hand, perhaps 
inadvertently, accepting the realities on the ground. The quandary frequently faced by 
international and local human rights organisations is made painfully plain by unheeded appeal 
issued by Amnesty International on the eve of the selection of members of interim parliament by 
participants of Somali peace and reconciliation conference in Nairobi in 2003. While particularly 
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aware that the conference is overwhelmingly dominated by notorious warlords and their allies 
who have been consistent and flagrant human rights violators, Amnesty International nonetheless 
unmistakably stated that: 
It would be unacceptable for faction leaders or former officials responsible in the past for 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and gross human rights violations to be given blanket 
impunity or amnesty and to be part of a new government obliged to abide by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the international human rights treaties ratified by 
Somalia in the past, which are still binding.86 
Ironically, the organization went on to state that it is imperative that "[p]arliamentary and 
presidential candidates should be asked to explain their human rights record and to pledge their 
personal commitment to protecting human rights in the future and the rule of law.”87 Evidently, 
the human rights record of the majority of the participants of the conference had been public 
knowledge, painstakingly documented by Amnesty International and other human rights 
organizations.88 There are several obvious problems with the position taken by Amnesty. First, it 
expects infamous warlords who have been incessantly victimizing vulnerable populations to 
become their saviours overnight. Second, it gives the warlords an undeserved legitimization for 
their attempt to acquire power or hold on to it. Finally, it inadvertently circumscribes any 
possibility of successfully challenging the power of self-proclaimed leaders. 
It is trite to state that the warlords will surely be buoyed by these statements and will be 
encouraged to pay lip service to human rights protection to placate seemingly perfunctory and 
contradictory demands of human rights organizations. It is contradictory because, on the one 
hand, the appeal suggests that warlords and other people accused of war crimes cannot be part of 
the new government. On the other hand, while accepting the inevitability of warlords becoming 
leaders, it asks them to pledge their personal commitment to safeguard the human rights of the 
population. Perhaps and more strikingly still, the warlords and faction leaders had already made 
countless public promises and previously proclaimed to have reached an understanding with 
respect to “[r]espect for and preservation of, fundamental human rights and democratic 
principles.”89 It is clear that if perpetrators are not held accountable for their past crimes and are 
allowed back into positions of authority without any safeguards, they will probably commit 
further human rights violations. Human Rights Watch thoroughly documented human rights 
abuses committed by the police force of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia(TFG) in 
2008. The report detailed extensive human rights violations including “widespread acts of 
murder, rape, looting, assault, arbitrary arrest and detention, and torture.”90 It is extremely 
troubling to learn that the government in question was dominated, from the president to the 
police chief, by warlords who had a history of perpetrating massive human rights abuses during 
Somali protracted civil war. 
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Some scholars forcefully contend that one of the fundamental purposes of judicial prosecution 
and other accountability mechanisms geared toward attainment of peace is deterrence and their 
ability to prevent future human rights and humanitarian law violations.91 Similarly, the General 
Assembly of the United Nations is convinced that “[t]he effective punishment of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity is an important element in the prevention of such crimes, the protection 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the encouragement of confidence, the furtherance of 
co-operation among peoples and the promotion of international peace and security”.92 In the 
same vein, the Security Council in establishing the (Former) Yugoslavia Tribunal asserted its 
belief that “the prosecution of persons responsible for [...] violations of international humanitarian 
law will contribute to ensuring that such violations are halted and effectively rendered.”93 
Conversely, other commentators argue, however, that there is an insufficient evidence that the 
threat of or actual criminal prosecutions will deter future violators of human rights to commit 
heinous crimes, as there is no evidence that capital punishment deters crimes.94In that respect, the 
Allies’ threat to criminally prosecute the German perpetrators did not stop the atrocities being 
committed unhindered. Likewise, gross violations continued unabated in Kosovo after the Chief 
Prosecutor of the Yugoslavia Tribunal informed the Yugoslav authorities of the intention to 
investigate and prosecute the perpetrators of these horrible crimes.95 In a more recent example, 
the judicial trials in Rwanda by both international as well as domestic courts did not prevent 
continuous gross human rights abuses perpetrated by the remnants of the deposed extremist 
government forces, and to a lesser extent by the current government army.96 
The other advantage of judicial prosecution is to individualise guilt and remove the stigma of 
collective guilt. It ensures that innocent members of a particular group are not blamed for crimes 
committed by others.97 By the same token, criminal prosecutions forestall any inclination to 
implement vigilante justice. Criminal trials of individuals accused of massive human rights abuses 
give a very powerful signal that particular individuals are criminally responsible for the heinous 
crimes suffered by the victims, but there is no collective blame for the whole community or ethnic 
group.98 In Somalia, representatives of some clans blame other clans collectively for atrocities 
perpetrated by individual warlords.99 Holding individuals, who were responsible for human rights 
abuses, responsible may help Somali communities to recognise that the whole clan cannot be held 
responsible for crimes of individuals.  
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It is also evident that insisting on criminal trials or social justice without thorough reform of the 
system of government, particularly ‘institutions of rule’ to prevent recurrence of the past atrocities, 
will be undoubtedly ineffective.100 Similarly, ‘show trials’ carried out haphazardly and hurriedly 
and their concomitant harsh punishment will definitely not serve to contribute to the peace, 
stability and reconciliation in the future.101 The current Ethiopian government, for example, 
embarked upon prosecuting members of the former military regime who were accused of 
committing gross human rights violations.102 After the complete defeat of the Ethiopian military 
dictator Mengistu, thousands of former officials were arrested. These individuals were charged 
with horrible crimes including genocide, disappearance and crimes against humanity. Thousands 
of those accused had been in detention without trial for more than a decade.103 However, such 
public prosecutions did not prevent the current government perpetrating the egregious, massive 
human rights violations both inside and outside the country with impunity.104 The very poor 
human rights record of the Ethiopian “emerging democracy” indicates that trials and 
prosecutions alone do not necessarily deter violations from occurring. Similarly, the highly 
publicised trial of Saddam Hussein and his associates by the Iraqi Tribunal have not prevented 
thousands of deaths and other massive human rights abuses perpetrated in Iraq during or in the 
aftermath.105 As Martha Minow persuasively points out: “trials should not be pursued where there 
is no chance for fairness or perception of fairness [...]”.106 In Somalia’s case, since there is no 
functioning government that can carry out investigations and domestic courts to adjudicate the 
cases, it is not impossible to implement judicial prosecutions to deal with past human rights 
violations. In addition, the international community has not shown any willingness to establish an 
international tribunal for Somalia. Consequently, any haphazard judicial prosecution attempts 
will not be successful. Is it possible to implement other non-judicial transitional justice 
mechanisms like truth commission in Somalia?  
 
II.2 Truth Commissions as a Tool to Deal with Past Atrocities in Collapsed States 
 
Criminal proceedings are not the only option available when dealing with past atrocities. Many 
countries emerging from repressive regimes have opted for an alternative accountability method 
known as “truth commission”.107 The number of countries that adopted non-judicial 
accountability mechanisms has proliferated tremendously. It appears that their decision is not 
only driven by legal or moral reasons but was rather necessitated and informed by practical 
considerations.108 For instance, as Goldstone argued, if the African National Congress (ANC) in 
South Africa stubbornly demanded criminal prosecutions for leaders of apartheid regime “there 
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would have been no peaceful transition to democracy.”109 The fact is that leaders of the apartheid 
government were in charge of the military and most other government institutions and if they felt 
that they were being targeted and started to resist, that could plunge the country into a civil war. 
Some conspicuous benefits of the criminal prosecutions notwithstanding, there are situations in 
which, for practical or other pragmatic, or political considerations, alternative non-judicial 
proceedings like truth commissions are more appropriate to deal with past atrocities.110 
Furthermore, truth commissions are sufficiently capable of not only creating truth and 
trustworthy public records of egregious past human rights violations, but can also catapult system 
reform which is indispensable in deterring atrocious abuses from recurring in the future.111 In 
actuality, truth commissions are used in two settings. First, truth commissions are used in 
circumstances where atrocities like torture and disappearances were perpetrated clandestinely. In 
these cases such as Argentina, Chile and El Salvador the purpose was to inform the public about 
the crimes of the previous regime. In other situations, atrocities were committed publicly but 
there are different versions of the truth as the examples of Liberia and Sierra Leone show.112 
Moreover, past experience has sufficiently shown that truth commissions seem to be “a potentially 
valuable complementary tool in the quest for justice and reconciliation, taking as they do a victim-
centred approach and helping to establish a historical record and recommend remedial 
action.”113  
Truth commissions organised in different countries over the years have employed various 
methods. The conditional amnesty laws recently promulgated by South Africa and Guatemala 
were distinctly different from the previous blanket amnesties passed in 1970s and 1980s by 
government in Latin America during the transitional periods from repressive regimes to fledgling 
democracy.114 The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission offered conditional 
amnesty. The accused was required to come clean and provide all the details of the crimes he or 
she is alleged to have committed after which the commission decides on the eligibility for 
amnesty. In Guatemala, certain crimes like disappearance, torture or genocide were purposely 
excluded from amnesty, while courts were authorised to grant amnesty for some politically 
motivated and other common crimes perpetrated during the civil war.115 Similarly, the 
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation established in 2002 in East Timor, while 
evidently drawing heavily on the experience of its South African predecessor, have decided to 
exclude major crimes like murder and rape. However, lesser crimes like burning, looting and 
minor assault can be eligible for amnesty.116 It is vitally important, though, to acknowledge that to 
the victims whose livelihoods were destroyed, it may not be a negligible crime, but rather a matter 
of life and death.  
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Truth denotes knowing sufficiently about and formally recognising past atrocities. This official 
recognition can be a catalyst for a productive dialogue and understanding between various 
individuals and groups within society. It is important to note that there may be situations where 
judicial prosecutions are not suitable like Somalia where there is no functioning government that 
controls the whole country. For example, fledgling democracies and feeble transitional authorities 
may not withstand politically motivated trials and their destabilising effects.117 Some 
commentators observe that disclosing the truth should suffice and trials and judicial prosecutions 
are not conducive for reconciliation.118 For instance, Mendez argues that even if the state is 
legitimately unable to mete out punishment, the state is under an obligation to investigate and 
furnish complete facts about the past atrocities.119 However, others contend that knowledge of the 
facts alone will not suffice, because the interpretation of the facts is more important to foster a 
shared past.120 Similarly, for a truth commission to have any reasonable chance of success, it may 
be necessary to create “a powerful political consensus behind the reconciliation [...]” prior to 
establishing any truth commission.121 
Meanwhile, deciding on the composition of members of truth commissions may be an 
insurmountable hurdle, particularly in situations where the multifaceted social and political 
divisions are acute. In Somalia, even though all the provisional constitutions since 2000 provide 
for the establishment of an independent truth and reconciliation commission, all governments 
failed to constitute it because of lack of consensus on the criteria to select members of the 
commission.122 As experience elsewhere demonstrates, if local political actors fail to agree on the 
composition of truth commission, they may use outside experts to ensure the process is seen as 
objective. For example, in El Salvador, the truth commission consisted entirely of foreigners to 
ensure objectivity. However, detractors can claim that truth established by foreigners has 
inadequate impact on the local population. To utilise the expertise of both nationals and 
foreigners and to combine their efforts may be a better option as was the case in Guatemala.123 
Nevertheless, naming and officially identifying the perpetrators may compel them to acknowledge 
the responsibility for their violations and thereby recognise ‘the dignity of the victims’. Moreover, 
making public the atrocities carried out by state agents to achieve political goals will help 
delegitimize the activities of the previous regime. In that manner, both past and potential victims 
are reassured that the same egregious crimes will not be committed.124 If victims are asked to 
forgive the perpetrators, then it is necessary for the victims to know who to forgive and what for, 
otherwise it will be a mockery of justice and a facade employed to enable the claim that 
something has been done.125 However, it is vitally important that there is no consensus about the 
positive effects of truth finding on reconciliation.126 The other problem with regards to truth 
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commissions is that, after decades of conflict, parties may subscribe to different narratives while 
talking about the same event. For example, in Somalia, every clan or group believes that they are 
the absent victims of an impartial investigation.127 
The lack of peace, security and political stability may sometimes sufficiently stymie attempts to 
gather reliable evidence pertaining to previous violations. Furthermore, there may be legitimate 
and sound reasons to abstain from prosecutions if the majority of the population deem 
prosecution, through referendum or through their legitimate representatives, will not serve the 
best interests of peace and stability.128 In stark contrast, during one of the peace and reconciliation 
conferences for Somalia, clan representatives and faction leaders were asked to collectively forgive 
each other without disclosing any facts nor what actions warranted forgiveness. The tragic irony is 
that some warlords who were allegedly responsible for gross atrocities themselves refused to sit 
with members of other clans because their clan supposedly committed crimes against another. In 
that manner, the perpetrators attempted to avoid individual criminal responsibility by skilfully 
promoting it collectively. It goes without saying that any attempt by others rather than the victim 
to forgive miserably fails to take the suffering of the victims into proper consideration.129For a 
successful truth commission to be established there is a need for a functioning government to be 
in place to institute the truth commission, and subsequently deal with the outcome of the 
investigation.  
II.3 Can Lustration Work in Somalia?  
 
One of the mechanisms that have been employed to deal with human rights abuses is lustration. 
In some situations it was considered impractical and destabilising to start judicial proceedings 
against all the individuals involved. For instance, the transition from communist rule in the late 
80s and early 90s used lustration to deal with past human rights abuses.130 It meant purging 
former officials who were implicated in the atrocities. However, it is important to state that such 
approaches were not confined to Central and Eastern European Countries. For example, in El 
Salvador hundreds of senior military officials were compelled to take early retirement, after 
thorough reviews of the individual records. One of the obvious advantages of the purge schemes 
is the possibility of dealing with a large number of cases in a very short time without being 
handcuffed by the requirements of criminal process standards. Furthermore, they are 
comparatively cheaper in terms of financial and human resources. For example, in Bosnia the 
majority of the former police officers who were implicated in the ethnic conflict were excluded 
from local new police forces.131 
There are several weaknesses and deficiencies with respect to lustration that need to be 
considered. First, no due process guarantees consistency with international human rights 
standards. Second, the system is susceptible to mistakes and calculated political misuse.132 
Moreover, in collapsed states like Somalia, all government institutions are entirely ruined, so there 
are no officials to flush out; however, it is possible to exclude them from coming back to the fold 
when and if people are recruited in the reconstruction of vital state institutions. Arguably, the 
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danger of this seemingly arbitrary system is that it tends to deal with classes or categories of 
people without regard to individual criminal responsibility, thus lustration may produce a number 
of cases of injustice of its own.133 Moreover, in Somalia where the current conflict is characterised 
as clan-based, it can fuel further violence and antagonism because clans that the purged 
individuals belonged to could claim that they were unfairly targeted.134 However, for lustration to 
be suitable in Somalia, it must be preceded by an independent investigation to establish the full 
truth of what and the individuals who perpetrated it. Based on the outcome of that investigation, 
it might be eventually possible to exclude individuals from official rule in the newly reconstituted 
state institutions. Nevertheless, given the duration of the conflict and lack of any documentary 
evidence it would dauntingly challenging to carry out a full and fair investigation into all past 
human rights violations. If all the aforementioned transitional justice mechanisms like judicial 
prosecution, truth commission and lustration are not suitable for Somalia at the moment, can 
amnesty be utilised to achieve peace and reconciliation? 
 
II.4 Is Amnesty a Panacea to Somali’s Post-Conflict Crisis? 
 
Amnesty for human rights violations consists of a range of variations including blanket amnesty, 
individual amnesty for certain leaders of previous regimes, or amnesty in exchange for truth as 
prominently applied by South Africa. There are arguments for and against amnesty. Some 
commentators passionately argue that amnesties are not compatible with human rights or the 
quest for justice.135 Others submit that, in certain cases, an amnesty may be an indispensable 
exchange for peace. In that light, any amnesty offered should be utilised only when all other 
options fail, and applicable only to limited situations.136 
 
It is important to mention that amnesty has been frequently used since the 1970s. Since then, 
approximately 14 countries have adopted amnesty as an accountability mechanism and passed 
amnesty laws shielding perpetrators of human rights abuses against criminal prosecution or other 
liability emanating from the crimes concerned.137 Giving human rights perpetrators immunity 
from prosecution, however, clearly contravenes the victims’ rights to justice. In that regard, article 
2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights urges state parties to ensure that 
anyone whose rights enumerated in this instrument is infringed “[s]hall have an effective 
remedy...” Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions proposes amnesty to ensure cessation of 
hostilities. In that respect, article 6(5) stipulates that: “[a]t the end of hostilities, the authorities in 
power shall endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in 
the armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, 
whether they are interned or detained.”  
However, it is argued that the amnesty in question only concerns minor violations and does not 
apply to grave violations of international humanitarian law. In that respect, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) argues that the amnesty provision should only apply to those 
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combatants who did not violate international humanitarian law.138 Furthermore, it is also argued 
that granting violators of certain serious human rights violators is unlawful under international 
law.139 Along the same lines, the Human Rights Committee, in one of its comments on article 7 of 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) held that, as far as the crime of 
torture is concerned, amnesties granted are “generally incompatible with the duty of states to 
investigate such acts.”140 Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights held that the 
Convention against Torture does not permit granting amnesties which inoculate individuals, 
accused of torture, from criminal or civil trials or other penalties.141 
In conjunction with ongoing conflicts like Somalia, some argue that it is necessary to offer amnesty 
to perpetrators in order to ensure the cessation of hostilities and facilitate a smooth transition. 
Furthermore, the current Somali government is fragile and is not in control of the whole country 
and has to contend with warlords and regional leaders who may still wield considerable power 
within the nascent army and militias.142 However, it is important to thoroughly assess whether 
amnesty can have the desired effect in an idiosyncratic context before committing to such an 
arrangement. For instance, the government in Uruguay decided to honour the amnesty law 
promulgated by the military government and also declined to significantly disclose the truth of 
what actually happened. After a relentless campaign organised by parts of the citizenry the 
government agreed to hold a referendum on whether to keep or rescind the amnesty law. The 
majority of the population decided to keep the impunity in place.143 It is imperative to assiduously 
acknowledge that such popular decisions are capable of bringing the society together and 
promoting reconciliation. Additionally, if amnesty is tied to other non-judicial accountability 
mechanism like a truth commission, it can be effective and cannot be equated with impunity.144 
Amnesty has often been used as a political carrot to end conflicts. In such situations, more 
importance is attached to arresting ongoing violence. For example, even though US president Bill 
Clinton undiplomatically characterised the authority in Haiti as “plainly the most brutal, the most 
violent regime anywhere [...]” in the northern hemisphere, his administration brokered “a good 
agreement for the United States and for Haiti” which granted amnesty from prosecution to the 
Haitian military leaders.145 That was in clear contrast to the previous promise that the return of 
the exiled Haitian president Aristide, will take place “under conditions of national reconciliation 
and mutual respect for human rights.”146 However, the US administration and the United 
Nations and other regional organisations enormously pressured Aristide to accept the amnesty for 
the military leaders.147 It is crucial to state that the agreement led to the military junta peacefully 
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handing over power to the civilian authority and that the human rights violations came to an 
end.148 Furthermore and more importantly, the Haitian democratically elected representatives 
enacted laws in support of the amnesty which they believed were “likely to reconcile the nation 
[...]”.149 
In an attempt to end the civil war in Sierra Leone, the rebel Revolutionary United Front led by 
Foday Sankoh signed a peace agreement with the Sierra Leonean government in July 1999.150 
The Lomé Agreement offered unconditional blanket amnesty “[t]o all combatants and 
collaborators in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives, up to the time of 
the signing of the agreement”.151 The UN representative attached a caveat before signing the 
agreement which read: “[t]he United Nations interprets that the amnesty and pardon in the 
article nine of this agreement shall not apply to the international crimes of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and other various violations of international humanitarian law.”152 
The UN representative who added this reservation to the agreement before signing heavily 
rebuked human rights organisations for chastising the amnesty clause, claiming that without the 
offer of the amnesty the war would have continued with dire consequences for the civilian 
population.153 By the same token, much of the Sierra Leonean civilian population supported the 
amnesty in the hope that the agreement would end the hostilities and herald a period of peace 
and stability. Likewise, representatives of civil society groups endorsed the agreement and the 
amnesty at a national conference.154 However, the Lomé Agreement, like its predecessor three 
years previously, collapsed before the ink was properly dry.155 
In my judgement, it is wrong to solely blame the failure of the Lomé Agreement on the fact that it 
offered amnesty to the perpetrators of the human rights violations. It is difficult indeed to 
determine whether the collapse of these peace agreements lay in the strategy of offering blanket 
amnesty itself or in its implementation. In that respect, a more plausible explanation would be the 
precariousness of the security situation of the country and the lack of a strong authority to 
satisfactorily implement the terms of the agreement.156 In other situations, amnesties offered to 
the combatants facilitated peace and the disarmament of the armed groups. For example, in 
Mozambique the government and rebels signed an agreement after almost 16 years of devastating 
civil war. Amnesty was offered to all the parties of the conflict and as a consequence the rebels 
agreed to disarm. The agreement was equally observed by the two sides and there has not been 
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any civil war since 1992.157 Similarly, in Spain, after the death of Franco, an amnesty was 
implemented and the transition was orderly.158 
To be sure, offering amnesty in exchange for confessions, as employed by the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, can be a very good instrument to establish trustworthy 
records of past human rights abuses. However, it is not necessary to implement justice 
mechanisms as soon as the new regime comes to power, but it might be necessary to delay any 
planned action till the time is ripe and conditions on the ground permit. In view of that, Nigel 
Biggar ambitiously suggests that thinking of a criminal justice system not merely as a tool to 
punish perpetrators but as an instrument to take victims’ sufferings into account and drastically 
placate them remedies the seemingly unbridgeable difference between justice and negotiating 
peace.159 Similarly, Mamdani argues in the African context “where relentless pursuit of justice in 
the post-independence period had all often turned into vengeance”, it is not prudent to follow 
Nuremberg example, but South African model would be more suitable seeking “to reconcile 
rather than punish, to look forward rather than backward.”160 
However, as the situation in Somalia clearly demonstrates, amnesty alone is not sufficient. This 
formula of offering unconditional amnesty to the perpetrators of human rights abuses has been 
recurrently tried and tested during peace and reconciliation conferences for the last two decades 
and it did not produce any meaningful peace or feasible political settlement.161 The only time that 
justice for past atrocities was vaguely mentioned in a Somali peace agreement was the agreement 
between the transitional federal government and the alliance for the re-liberation of Somalia in 
2009. Article 9 of the agreement stated that “a high level committee, chaired by the UN, shall be 
established...to follow up on issues relating to the political cooperation between the parties and 
concerns over justice and reconciliation.”162 However, there have been no follow up and the issue of 
dealing with past human rights abuses did not get any further attention.  
II.5 Can Universal Jurisdiction Compensate for the Lack of Domestic Judicial 
Capability? 
 
The concept of universal jurisdiction could compensate the unwillingness or lack of capacity of 
some states to prosecute people accused of egregious violations of human rights.163 It confers on 
every state with jurisdiction of certain international crimes irrespective of the nationality of both 
the victim and perpetrator or the place where the crimes have taken place.164 In light of that, the 
General Assembly of the United Nations declared that “war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
wherever they are committed shall be subject to investigation”, and furthermore, individuals 
“whom there is evidence that they have committed such crimes shall be subject to tracing, arrest, 
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trial and, if found guilty, to punishment.”165 However, a very small number of states recognised 
and enacted legislation enabling domestic courts to adjudicate these crimes irrespective of where 
they occur.166 It is important to keep in mind that countries are not obliged to start proceedings 
grounded in the principle of universal jurisdiction, in that respect “allowing states having 
jurisdiction not to bring the case before their courts for reasons of expediency.”167 
The principle of universal jurisdiction can be misused and politically motivated indictments and 
prosecutions can be pursued. Increasingly, prosecutors of foreign countries have started 
investigations and sometimes prosecutions of individuals accused of committing gross human 
rights violations on the basis of universal jurisdiction.168 More strikingly still, after the legitimate 
representatives of the country decided to forgo criminal trials and opt for other accountability 
mechanisms, some victims who are not satisfied with that approach can start proceedings outside 
the country.169 However, such interference and evident disregard for domestic decisions can have 
sweeping political consequence if the judges and prosecutors of a third country are allowed to 
meddle in the internal affairs of other countries without adequate knowledge of all the issues 
involved.170 
Conversely, others argue that ‘a bona fide amnesty’ like the one implemented in South Africa 
would not expect any difficulties and the prosecutors of other countries could take them into 
account when determining whether to bring charges.171 The obvious trouble with that proposition 
is that judging the authenticity of any given amnesty by outside authorities is in itself prone to 
political considerations. What is indisputable, however, is the fact that the overwhelming majority 
of the universal jurisdiction cases were adjudicated in wealthy states, while individuals on trial 
have been mostly from poorer countries.172 This indicates that there is an apparent inequality and 
developing countries are unable to bring perpetrators from powerful states to trail for 
international crimes.173 For example, a Belgium judge issued a warrant for the arrest of then the 
incumbent Foreign Minister of Democratic Republic of the Congo, Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, 
accusing him of committing grave breaches of Geneva conventions as well as crimes against 
humanity. Subsequently, the Congo legally challenged the issued arrest at the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ). In ruling for the Congo, the ICJ held that Belgium “by means of its own choosing, 
cancel the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 and so inform the authorities to whom that warrant 
was circulated.”174 Given the troubled history between the two countries it cannot be ruled out 
                                                
165 UN General Assembly Resolution 3073 (1973), Principles of International Cooperation in the Detention, 
Arrest, Extradition and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, 3 
December 1973. 
166 K. Randall, ‘Universal Jurisdiction under International Law’, Texas Law Review 1988, pp. 785, 834; L. 
Reydams, ‘Universal Jurisdiction over Atrocities in Rwanda: Theory and Practice’, European Journal of Crime, 
Criminal Law & Criminal Justice 1996, pp. 18-47; L.A. Casey and D.B. Rivkin, ‘The Limits of Legitimacy: The 
Rome Statute’s Unlawful Application to Non-State Parties’, Virginia Journal of International Law 2003-2004, p. 80. 
167 Reydams, ‘Universal Jurisdiction over Atrocities’, p. 22. 
168 C.C. Jalloh, ‘Universal Jurisdiction, Universal Prescription? A Preliminary Assessment of the African Union 
Perspective on Universal Jurisdiction’, Criminal Law Forum 2010, pp.1,2 
169 N.J. Kritz, Where We Are and How We Got Here, p. 29; for a detailed discussion on the impact of the 
Pinochet Case domestically as well as internationally see, J. Zalaquett, ‘The Pinochet Case: International and 
Domestic Repercussions’ in A.H. Herkin (ed.), The Legacy of Abuse: Confronting the Past, Facing the Future, New York: 
The Aspen Institute and New York University School of Law 2002, pp. 47-69. 
170 Ivan Šimonović, Dealing with the Legacy, p. 706. 
171 Kamminga, ‘Lessons Learned from the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction’, p. 958. 
172 Exception of the rule was the failed proceedings started in Senegal against president of Chad, Hussein Habré. 
However, it is important to mention that the extradition proceedings was started at the behest of Belgium judge 
request, see idem, p. 963. 
173 Can anyone imagine Egypt or Iran holding American leaders responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands 
of Iraqi citizens? 
174 Arrest Warrant of 1 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, ICJ Reports 
2002, p. 3, para. 78; for thorough discussion on the legal issues raised by the case see, K.R.Gray, ‘Case 
Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium)’, European 
 SPRING ISSUE 2016 
 
24 
that the decision to issue the arrest warrant was politically motivated.175 In a similar vein, the 
government of Serbia unsuccessfully sought the extradition of former Bosnian vice president, Ejup 
Ganic, from Britain accusing him of commission of war crimes during the war in Former 
Yugoslavia in 1992. It is significantly important to note that the allegations set forth in the 
extradition request had already thoroughly been investigated and rejected by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia.176 However, the judge blocked the extradition for lack 
of evidence and observed that his trial could be “politically motivated”.177 
This apparent power imbalance makes the whole universal jurisdiction exercise seem unfair and 
lopsided. To be sure, the nationals of powerful states cannot be tried by other states without 
risking retaliation. For example, when criminal indictments were filed against a number of US 
officials with respect to crimes allegedly committed in Iraq during the first Gulf War, the US 
defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld stridently denounced what he termed as “divisive politicised 
lawsuits”. He then strongly warned Belgium authority to either drop the charges or face a boycott 
of NATO’s Brussels head office.178 Subsequently, Belgium was finally and humiliatingly 
compelled to back down.179 More strikingly still, the United States House of Representatives 
promulgated a law mandating the invasion of the Netherlands where the International Criminal 
Court is based, if any attempt was made to put an American soldier on criminal trial.180 For 
instance, in 2005, a Belgian judge issued an international arrest warrant for the former Chadian 
president Hissene Habré and officially requested his host country Senegal to extradite him 
immediately.181 In that connection, the African Union recently vociferously complained about 
“blatant abuse of principle of universal jurisdiction” and called for “immediate termination of all 
pending indictments”.182 Later, the African union asked Senegal to prosecute Habré “on behalf of 
Africa”.183 In 2011 and 2012 Belgium again tried to submit extradition requests to Senegal but 
failed to follow the required procedure.184 After Senegal failed to extradite Habé, Belgium 
launched proceedings against Senegal at the International Court of Justice. In 2012, the court 
found that Senegal breached its obligation under article 6(2) of the Convention against Torture.185 
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As a result, on 20 July 2015, the trial of Hisséne Habré started in Senegal.186 It cannot be denied 
that, as Human Rights Watch acknowledges, that “it is a reality that international justice has been 
applied unevenly. Powerful countries and their allies have often been able to avoid justice when 
serious crimes are committed.”187 
Sometimes individuals who are accused of horrible violations of human rights in their country 
settle in other countries as refugees. In that manner, they try to stay outside the reach of domestic 
justice. In that light, the independent expert, Mona Rishmawi, encouraged third countries to 
make every possible effort to hold accountable those alleged to have committed grave human 
rights violations in Somalia.188 The host countries of such individuals can act in accordance with 
their international obligations. For example, in 1996 Canada blocked Rwandan official, Leon 
Mugesera, who was accused of incitement to genocide from asylum in Canada and subsequently 
ordered his expulsion.189 In contrast, Somali former officials and warlords who masterminded or 
instigated the civil strife and gross human rights violations in Somalia easily settled outside the 
country as refugees or frequently visit abroad for different purposes. It is argued that refusing 
them settlement or starting investigations into their past atrocities would send a very strong 
message that anyone who grossly violates human rights and humanitarian law will be held to 
book wherever they may be. However, the deterrent effect of the principle of universal 
jurisdiction is not certain.190 The other aim of the applying the principle of universal jurisdiction is 
to achieve justice by shaming governments in the countries where the atrocities took place into 
action.191 Nonetheless, in situations where the state institutions completely collapsed like Somalia, 
that strategy is not effective for there is no authority to shame or prompt into action. 
The standard of acceptable evidence in criminal proceedings is much higher than the evidentiary 
threshold of civil trials.192 In addition, investigating crimes committed in foreign countries 
requires not only particular skills but also expert knowledge of pertinent international criminal 
law.193 For instance, in 2005 a Somali warlord was arrested in Sweden after some members of 
Somali Diaspora filed a criminal complaint against him, accusing him of committing war crimes 
that occurred in Somalia in 1991. Even though video evidence was presented the case never came 
to trial and the warlord was subsequently released due to lack of evidence.194 In another case, 
some Somali individuals successfully brought civil suits, under the US Alien Tort Claims Act, 
against former Somali defence minister and vice president Mohamed Ali Samatar for serious 
human rights abuses including torture and extrajudicial killings that he allegedly committed in 
Somalia. Samatar argued that he was entitled to immunity from the US courts under the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The US Supreme Court unanimously held that government 
officials who perpetrate human rights abuses whilst in office do not enjoy immunity.195 
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Nonetheless, even if the court rules in favour of the plaintiff, it is not certain that political 
considerations will not stymie the implementation of the findings of the court. For instance, in 
1980, a Paraguayan national residing in the United States brought a civil suit against a former 
police official from his home country, at the time visiting the United States, accusing him of 
torturing a family member to death.196 Unfortunately, US officials allowed the defendant to 
return to his own country before the court had chance to deal with the merits of the case. 
Consequently, the plaintiff received no compensation whatsoever, and the accused did not have 
to be held accountable for his alleged actions.197 
The concept of universal jurisdiction can be an effective tool to fight impunity and provide a good 
mechanism of transitional justice if properly, impartially and systematically applied. However, in 
situations like Somalia where protracted violence has been ongoing for decades, the few 
individuals indicted and isolated criminal and civil lawsuits will have a negligible impact on the 
efforts to end the impunity at best. First, the number of perpetrators who can be held accountable 
for their actions is negligibly limited. In addition, without proper investigation of the all the 
atrocities and their root causes, isolated indictment will be unlikely to contribute to reconciliation, 
nor the pursuit of peace and system reform that are prerequisite for the prevention of recurrence 
of such horrible atrocities. 
 
III. Concluding Remarks 
 
The objective of transitional justice is to give societies affected by conflict and gross human rights 
violation a suitable way to deal with the past effectively. In actuality, justice is generally 
erroneously associated with punishment of individuals who have committed massive human rights 
abuses. This article discussed a range of ways of dealing with gross human rights violations 
including judicial mechanisms, truth commissions, lustration, compensation and amnesty, taking 
different contextual situations into account. Justice is seen as a cornerstone for the creation of 
legitimacy for the state and its institutions. In Somalia’s case, the United Nations repeatedly 
asserted that without holding perpetrators of human rights violations accountable for their crimes, 
peace will be only an interim situation. The article illustrated that for transitional justice to have 
any chance of success, domestic structures should be put in place first. As the Commission on 
Human Rights recognised: “the prevailing tragic circumstances in Somalia, particularly the lack 
of government authority” requires particular measures to safeguard the protection of human 
rights.198 It is also important to establish the complete truth of past atrocities, the reasons that 
caused such crimes to be perpetrated and the identities of individuals who were responsible. 
Exposing the crimes of the past regime will discredit and delegitimize it in such a way that the 
necessity of system reform will be established.199 The article argued that in Somalia where the 
conflict has been going on for decades, where both perpetrators and victims number in the 
hundreds of thousands if not in their millions, no proper documentation of past crimes exists. 
Restoration of law and order and stability takes priority. When the state institutions start to 
function, decisions based on political consensus and on victims’ needs can deal with the past 
violations. If ill-considered decisions on criminal prosecution are rammed through early in the 
post-conflict period, it can unnecessarily rekindle the cycle of violence. What is required is to 
build an accountable and professional security system. A robust justice system will have a better 
chance of preventing the recurrence of human rights abuses. The article concluded that an 
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obvious dilemma needs to be solved. Without some kind of accountability or premise thereof, it 
would be challenging to achieve durable peace and reconciliation. At the same time, without 
functioning state institutions it is impossible to administer justice. In that respect, a balance should 
be struck taking the past into account and at the same time rebuilding state institutions capable of 
preventing atrocities from recurring. As Soren Kierkergaard observed, “life can only be 
understood backwards, but it must be lived forward.”200 In that respect, what is required is a 
policy that takes past atrocities into account and devises mechanisms geared towards both dealing 
with the past and preparing for future stability. It is also clear from the above analysis that in 
order to implement one of the aforementioned transitional justice mechanisms, a functioning 
government is a prerequisite. 
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